El rompecabezas de las preferencias sociales by Brandts, Jordi & Fatás, Enrique
The Puzzle of Social PreferenceS
El rompEcabEzas dE las prEfErEncias socialEs
Jordi brandts  jordi.brandts@uab.cat  jordi.brandts@iae.csic.es
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Spain
Institute for Economic Analysis (IAE-CSIC). Spain
EnriquE Fatas e.fatas@uea.ac.uk
University of East Anglia. United .ingdom
abstract
We present a brief overview of the experimental economics literature on social preferences. in numerous 
experiments, economically incentivized subjects are willing to sacrifice part of their material earnings to com-
pensate the kind behavior of others, or will be willing to reciprocate at a non-negligible cost, or even pay a 
positive price for punishing the behavior of selfish individuals. All these actions are labeled as social in econo-
mics because there is no apparent way to reconcile them with any reasonable form of pure self-interest.  We 
focus on social dilemma games and want to communicate two main messages. first, research in experimental 
economics has produced abundant evidence that illustrates the social components of people’s preferences. 
second, social sanctions of different types play an important role in facilitating cooperative behavior.
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rEsumEn
presentamos un breve panorama de la literatura en economía experimental sobre preferencias sociales. En 
numerosos experimentos, participantes con incentivos económicos están dispuestos a sacrificar parte de sus 
ingresos materiales para compensar el comportamiento amable de otros o a pagar un precio positivo para 
castigar el comportamiento de individuos egoístas. En economía todas estas acciones reciben el calificativo 
de sociales, porque no hay una manera clara de reconciliarlas con alguna forma razonable de egoísmo puro. 
nos centramos en juegos de dilemas sociales y queremos transmitir dos mensajes. primero, la investigación 
en economía experimental ha producido abundante evidencia que ilustra los componentes sociales de las 
preferencias de las personas. segundo, sanciones sociales de diferentes tipos desempeñan un papel impor-
tante a la hora de facilitar el comportamiento cooperativo.
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introduction
in a well-cited paper fehr and fischbacher (2002) call economics the dismal science 
because “economists routinely make worst-case assumptions regarding people’s moti-
ves” (page c1). The still dominant logic in economics could not be simpler: individuals 
are exclusively motivated by their material self-interest. The power of this assumption 
comes from its very simplicity: as a mostly normative assumption, it does consider any 
other behavioral regularity coming from real life or experimental tests of human behavior 
in economic contexts. in sharp contrast with the interest of economists in the diversity 
of economic decisions (e.g. in consumption), it simplifies human behavior assuming that 
subjects are homogeneous in their (null) social motivations. 
 What we know from the use of systematic experimentation with human subjects in eco-
nomically incentivized experiments is that participants very frequently choose actions that 
do not maximize their own monetary payoffs. These decisions become systematic when 
those actions affect others’ payoffs in very different domains: from market behavior to con-
sumer decisions, from tax compliance to employee reactions to changes in compensation 
schemes and organizational practices. The experimental economics literature calls these 
“other-regarding” preferences social preferences (see charness and rabin, 2002). 
 in this paper we present a brief overview of some experimental evidence of economic 
behavior in social dilemmas, at odds with the idea of self-interest. in these experiments, 
economically incentivized subjects are willing to sacrifice part of their material earnings 
to compensate the kind behavior of others, or will be willing to reciprocate at a non-neg-
ligible cost, or even pay a positive price for punishing the behavior of selfish individuals. 
all these actions are labeled as social in economics because there is no apparent way to 
reconcile them with any reasonable form of pure self-interest. 
 our paper only covers a rather small selection of studies in the area, which allows 
us to make our points.  We focus on social dilemma games and want to communicate 
two main messages. first, research in experimental economics has produced abundant 
evidence that illustrates the social components of people’s preferences. second, social 
sanctions of different types play an important in facilitating cooperative behavior.
 In the specific domain of social dilemmas  —a literature covered in detail by Chaud-
huri (forthcoming)—  social behavior is typically associated with the existence of some 
form of conditional cooperation. A significant fraction of subjects are typically reluctant 
to free ride on the behavior of others, and are willing to cooperate as much as the other 
group members do. in social dilemmas like linear public goods games, contributions 
are not purely altruistic, in the sense that they are not unconditional, and depend on the 
behavior of others. However, this conditional cooperation mechanism does not suffice to 
guarantee a socially optimal outcome. The existence of a significant proportion of free 
riders, and the same logic of conditional cooperation, generates an empirical regularity. 
contributions typically decline over time. 
 The introduction of sanctioning mechanisms solves, in most cases, this coopera-
tion problem. starting with Yamagishi (1986), different forms of sanctioning mechanisms 
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have been tested in the lab. a typical punishment mechanism consists of an additional 
decision stage. subjects may contribute (or not) to the public good and sanction free 
riders (or any other member in their group). The good news is that the public good provi-
sion largely benefits from the possibility of sanctioning defectors.
 The bad news is that sanctioning is not always optimal, from a collective point of 
view, when you consider the punishment costs (for both the punisher and the pun-
ished). moreover, sometimes punishment has no effects at all on the contributions of 
subjects.
 
social PrEFErEncEs in Economics
an enormous amount of research in experimental economics has been devoted to 
the analysis of non-selfish preferences. The capital reference regarding experimental 
research is Kagel and roth (1995), in which ledyard (1995) systematically reviews the 
experimental literature on public goods, at that period of time. Kagel and cooper (2010) 
update this literature, although they intentionally dismiss the literature on public goods 
games, covered by vesterlund (2010). fehr and schmidt (2006) and camerer (2003) in 
the lab and Rotemberg (2006) in the field are recent alternative reviews of social prefer-
ences. chaudhuri (2010) reviews the literature in public goods games. 
 in economics the idea of social preferences can be easily explained with the help of 
simple bargaining games, like the ultimatum game. in such a setting, a proposer submits 
an offer about how to divide a fixed pie to a Responder. The Responder may accept the 
division or reject it, and both of them get nothing. in the unique sub-game perfect equilib-
rium of the game, assuming both subjects are rational and selfish the Proposer offers a 
negligible proportion of the pie to the responder, and the responder accepts it. common 
knowledge of selfish rationality is strictly required. 
 in sharp contrast with this normative division, participants in experiments acting as 
proposers offer around 40% of the pie, while responders reject typically reject any offer 
under 30%. These results are robust enough to resist extreme tests in different cultural 
environments and for relatively large amounts of money.   Heinrich et al. (2001) run these 
experiments in 15 different small societies (with a limited contact with the western world) 
and slonim and roth (1998) and cameron (1999) found similar results in indonesia and 
slovakia with much larger pies, ranging from one month salary to one fourth of the aver-
age annual income per capita.
 Forsythe et al. (1994) were probably the first to disentangle strategic and social moti-
vations in experimental bargaining. They compared an ultimatum game with an alterna-
tive game in which the responder has no power to reject the offer (so, the proposer 
becomes a dictator). as there is no strategic interaction between players it is impossible 
to identify any equilibrium solution of the game.  The unique rational decision to be made 
by a rational selfish Dictator is to give nothing to the Responder. Subjects typically offer 
less than in the Ultimatum game, but most offers are still positive. 
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 The dictator game achieved a clear objective. it established that positive offers by 
proposers in the Ultimatum game could not be only driven by strategic, purely rational 
concerns. in a similar way, it is not obvious whether responders’ rejections of positive 
offers was simply due to an intrinsic disutility associated with an unfair distribution. a 
rejection could also be associated with an intentional action: punish the proposer. blount 
(1995) analyzed this possibility with two identical Ultimatum Games in which propos-
ers could be economically incentivized proposers (as in Güth et al., 1982), an external 
observer (with no specific reward) or robots making random choices. Decisions in the 
two treatments with human Proposers were remarkably similar, and significantly different 
from those in the robot treatment.
 some papers have tried to model, from a theoretically point of view, social prefer-
ences. The most influential papers are probably Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) and Charness and Rabin (2002). The first two papers focus on distribu-
tional concerns and show how other regarding preferences over income inequality could 
explain a large number of experimental outcomes, usually in small group bargaining type 
environments, which the “standard” economic model of strictly selfish preferences failed 
to organize. in contrast, the same preferences, under different institutions (e.g., competi-
tive markets) produced the standard results. 
 distributional models such as fehr and schmidt (1999) represent social preferences 
as “inequity aversion”. subjects experience an individually variable disutility whenever 
they receive a payoff different from the payoff received by others. The disutility is typically 
smaller when they are better than the others (advantageous inequity) than when they are 
worse than the others (disadvantageous inequity). bolton and ockenfels (2000) incorpo-
rates relative payoffs in a non-linear utility function. 
 charness and rabin (2002) tried to disentangle income inequality from intentional-
ity and reciprocity in an intentions based model incorporating participants’ beliefs about 
other group members’ actions. a similar insight is obtained in dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 
(2004), cox, friedman and Gjerstad (2007), cox, friedman and sadiraj (2008) and falk 
and Fischbacher (2006). Rabin (1993) is probably the first paper to highlight the relevance 
of beliefs (first and second order beliefs) about the strategies of the other players to evalu-
ate their intentions and account for other regarding preferences in the utility function. 
social PrEFErEncEs in social dilEmmas
bargaining games are zero-sum games with no tension between individual decisions 
and collective welfare. some of the most interesting results about social interaction come 
from a very different family of games in which social welfare (the sum of individual earn-
ings) depends upon the individual decisions of participants. social psychologists call 
these games social dilemmas, while economists tend to identify social dilemmas with 
public goods provided through voluntary contributions. We typically label this sort of 
experiments as Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (or vcm).
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 a typical vcm experiment consists of a series of experimental subjects being ran-
domly seated in a laboratory in independent separate groups of a certain size n. Each 
participant is given a certain and limited endowment per round, divided in a tokens or 
Experimental currency Units (EcU).  Within each group, each participant must make 
a simple allocation task between a private account and a group account. The private 
account has no additional returns, other than the security of keeping the EcU privately 
allocated. Each EcU allocated to the group account is multiplied by a certain parameter 
(strictly greater than 1, strictly smaller than n) and equally shared by all n group mem-
bers, regardless of their individual contributions to the public good.
 The group externality or social return of the public good generates a potential col-
lective benefit (as it is strictly larger than 1). The private benefit from the public good, 
however, is always smaller than the private one (as the social return is strictly smaller 
than n). Moreover, there is strategic uncertainty when investing privately, but the benefits 
coming from the public goods eventually depend in every individual decision.
 all decisions are made privately, anonymously and simultaneously. subjects get 
some information about past decisions (from average to full information about individual 
decisions) and the game is repeated several times (with or without random re-matching 
of groups after each round).
 The naïve game-theoretic prediction, based in the existence of rational selfish players 
who know they play game with identical counterparts, is that no one will ever contribute 
to the public good. free riding behavior will be the homogeneous behavioral pattern. 
in other words, for any positive contribution to the public good, not contributing is the 
dominant strategy in the sense that there is no other best response of the decision of 
the others, no matter what the others do. This public goods problem is a social dilemma 
because the optimal allocation for the group would be to fully invest in the public good.
 Examination of the data reveals that subjects do contribute something in almost every 
vcm experiment. However, contributions start around the 40% to 60% of the endowment 
and decline over time. individual behavior is extremely dispersed, with almost half of the 
subjects getting very close to the free riding prediction, and other half persistently choos-
ing a positive contribution to the public good (not inconsistent with the social preferences 
hypothesis based on the existence of other regarding preferences). note that positive 
contribution may be the consequences of mistakes, random choices or a huge variety of 
social preferences.
 The classical survey by Ledyard (1995) identifies three empirically proven factors that 
enhance cooperation in the laboratory: communication, threshold points and economic 
incentives (e.g. a higher social return).  The role of economic incentives is maybe not 
surprising. The larger the return of the public good, all other things equal, the more con-
tribution is observed.
 The role of the other two mechanisms is probably more interesting. The introduction 
of a provision point totally transforms the theoretical prediction of the game. Even for 
rational selfish players not contributing is not always the best response to the actions 
of the others. if my contribution is critically needed to make the whole group achieve 
118 • Jordi brandTs and EnriQUE faTas
ris, vol. 70. EXTra 1, 113-126, marzo 2012.. issn: 0034-9712  DOI 10.3989/rIS.2011.09.03
the goal of reaching the threshold, I may be better off contributing (getting the benefits 
of everybody else’s contribution) than not contributing at all (and getting no public good 
in return). in other words, there is no way to free ride on the contributions of others if 
the threshold is not reached (and the pubic good is not provided). The drawback of this 
contribution increase is that the provision of the public good is not systematically larger. 
many individual contributions get lost, as they don’t generate more public good. 
 communication generates an increase in contributions even when it is implemented 
in an anonymous environment and it is non-binding (e.g. subjects may or may not make 
a decision in line with their promises when cheap talking), as in dawes, mcTavish and 
shaklee (1977) and isaac and Walker (1988). 
 The impact of communication and thresholds are interesting when considering the 
large heterogeneity in social preferences. players differ not only in their social preferen-
ces (the intensity of their other regarding preferences), but also in their beliefs about the 
distribution of social preferences among their teammates.  probably on of the clearest 
regularities found in experimental public goods games is the existence of a significant 
proportion of conditional cooperators. contribution is positively correlated with their 
beliefs about the contributions to be made by their group members.
 This heterogeneity was originally attributed to different causes by experimentalists. 
it was partially explained by subjects’ confusion, as in andreoni (1995), or as a conse-
quence of a noisy and slow learning process of the strategic interaction as in andreoni 
(1988), palfrey and prisbrey (1997) or anderson, Goeree and Holt (1998). more recently, 
heterogeneity has been used to explain the decline in contributions observed in many 
experiments. Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001) find that 50% of their subject pool 
follows a behavioral pattern consistent with the idea of conditional cooperation, even 
when they typically contribute on average less than the last average contribution. This 
“self-serving”” bias (matching everybody else’s contribution at an individually profitable 
discount) generates the decline in contributions.
 The intuition is simple. any mix of conditional co-operators and free riders will make 
conditional co-operators to adjust their individual contributions to the last observed ave-
rage contribution. Heterogeneity makes conditional cooperation to adjust downwards 
their contributions given the presence of free riders. Keser and van Winden (2000) find 
that 80% of subjects use average group contributions as a reference point to adjust their 
individual decisions. sonnemans, schram and offerman (1999) use a clean within and 
between subjects in which subjects leave their group following a previously known pat-
tern. subjects contribute very little immediately before they leave a group but are strongly 
conditional cooperators while remaining in the same team.
 Kurzban and Houser (2005) first establish the type of their subjects in a sequence of 
public goods games. The distribution of types is very similar to other papers mentioned 
above: 63% are conditional cooperators, 20% are free-riders and 13% are unconditional 
cooperators. These patterns are stable across time and repetitions of the game with 
different opponents. 
 fischbacher and Gächter (2009, 2010) use both incentivized experiments and ques-
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tionnaires to elicit preferences and beliefs about other subjects’ average contribution. 
Experimental decisions and questionnaire answers are roughly consistent: 55% of parti-
cipants are conditional cooperators and 23% of them selfish free-riders. Eliciting beliefs 
after making decisions on contributions does not generate any sizeable effect on deci-
sions. Guillén et al (2010) show how beliefs can be optimally manipulated in the lab. 
 burlando and Guala (2005) check that this distribution is robust to the use of stra-
tegy method, and the decomposed game technique (see offerman et al., 1996). Kocher, 
cherry, Kroll, netzer and sutter (2008), Hermann and Thoni (2008) replicate these results 
using a heterogeneous subject pool, running the experiments in Usa, austria and Japan, 
and four different russian universities (located in urban and rural areas), respectively. 
brandts, saijo and schram (2004) replicate the analysis in Japan, netherlands, spain 
and Usa using the contribution function approach. The distribution does not significantly 
differ across countries, methodologies, and rural or urban areas.
social PrEFErEncEs and sanctions
conditional cooperators follow a solid behavioral rule: they mimic the behavior of the 
other group members. They adjust their decisions to the decisions of the others both 
upwards (when they are contributing below the average contribution of the others) and 
downwards (when they are contributing more than the others). both adjustment pro-
cesses could be associated with a mix of other regarding and selfish motivations, in 
a repeated environment. Typically, the mechanism is asymmetric: upward adjustments 
tend to be less intense and slower than downward changes. as Gächter (2007) puts it, 
“voluntary cooperation is fragile”: while conditional cooperators react to the contributions 
of the other team members, free riders do not. as a standard conditional cooperator is 
prone to apply some self-serving discount, not fully matching others’ contribution, the 
consequence will be a decline in contributions.
 The existence of a significant fraction of conditional cooperators in experimental social 
dilemmas raises some questions. could cooperators get engaged in further actions to 
make free riding more costly? Could they conceivable find a way to anticipate the decline 
making free riding more costly to free riders? The experimental literature shows that 
ostracizing and partner selection is widely used when available, when exclusion of free 
riders is possible. Gächter and Thöni (2005) and Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2007) find that 
sorting subjects by their cooperation levels significantly enhances public good provision. 
de oliveira, croson and Eckel (2009) inform subjects about the distribution of types in 
their own group, being types defined on the basis of a previously run experiment. Rela-
tive to a control treatment contribution, with no information about types, contribution is 
significantly higher when conditional cooperators are informed about the absence of free 
riders. Groups with no free riders are not able to sustain cooperation. page et al.  (2005), 
and cabrera et al. (2010) regroup subjects depending on their behavior. regrouping is 
endogenous in the former (subjects choose whom to be matched with) while institutional 
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in the latter (each round, the worst performer in group a is transferred to group b, while 
the best performer is transferred from b to a). contribution goes up to about 70% of the 
social optimum in the first paper, and to almost 90% of full contribution in the second 
(both in group a and b!). The participants’ possibility of choosing whom they are grouped 
with has a noticeable positive effect on efficiency. 
 The possibility of sanctioning free riders was first introduced in social sciences by 
social psychologists, as Yamagishi (1986, 1988), and political scientist, ostrom et al. 
(1992); fehr and Gachter (2000) is the canonical paper in economics. in this study, par-
ticipants in a linear public good experiment get the chance of sending costly punishment 
points to each other after getting information about individual contributions. punishment 
points are costly for the sender, and reduce receiver’s earnings using a proportional rule. 
rather than investing in a punishment fund to sanction the individual with the lowest 
contribution to the public good (as in Yamagishi, 1986), participants are allowed to send 
punishment points to any group member. 
 The difference is critical to understand how other regarding preferences shape 
punishment decisions. Subjects in Fehr and Gachter (2000) punish significantly more 
to those subjects contributing below the group average. but, some subjects do punish 
contributors, even when it is impossible to identify punishers (subjects are informed 
about the total number of punishment points they get per round).  The effect of this 
additional stage generates a large contribution increase. more interestingly, the posi-
tive effect on public good provision is not related to possible future gains, as authors 
tests the same mechanism in a partners (subjects stay in the same group for the ten 
rounds) and strangers (groups are reshuffled every round) matching design, finding 
similar results.
 For selfish players, punishing can hardly be a rational strategy. In the stage game 
of the partners condition, punishment becomes a second order public good, as sub-
jects cannot be excluded from their potential cooperation gains. sanctioning in the 
strangers condition makes even less sense for selfish players. The interesting lesson 
from this design is not that the possibility of excluding free riders generates coope-
ration gains (croson et al., 2006 document this result in a variety of institutions and 
games). it is that some kind of other regarding preferences is driving a major change 
in decisions and group performance. as fatas et al. (2010c) show, vertical punishment 
does not generate the same positive effect on contributions when it is implemented 
institutionally.
 The effectiveness of this combination of social preferences and punishment opportu-
nities is robust to parameter manipulations. nikiforakis and normann (2008) run a com-
parative static analysis of contribution gains as a function of the price of punishment (the 
receiver’s earning reduction over the sender’s cost). Even for low level of effectiveness, 
the usual decline in contributions is reversed. bochet, page and putterman (2006) test 
the effectiveness of punishment relative to communication in a repeated social dilemma 
game. punishment supplements anonymous communication and fosters contributions to 
almost full efficiency levels. 
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 However, the effectiveness of sanctions is severely reduced when the organiza-
tional structure is incomplete. fatas et al. (2010a) show that punishment is much less 
effective in incomplete networks, in which participants cannot observe the full distribu-
tion of individual contributions, so punishment is sometimes not available. moreover, 
it is the organizational structure, and not its density, what drives this result: star net-
works, in which one group member is commonly observed by all subjects, outperform 
any other incomplete network and does as well as a complete network (the organiza-
tional structure used in the seminal paper of fehr and Gachter, 2000). Their results 
can be rationalized in terms of social preferences. in fatas et al. (2010b) a simple 
model based on the existence of conditional cooperators explains how incomplete 
non-hierarchical networks (like the circle or the line) do worse: the signal coming from 
the commonly observed agent is missing. 
 Eckel et al (2010) document that status plays a counterintuitive role in incomplete 
networks (as the star). participants mimic too closely the behavior of high status central 
players and don’t challenge their decisions. as a consequence, punishment is rarely 
used, and contribution gains are negligible relative to an alternative treatment in which 
the status of the central player is low (her decisions are challenged openly, punishment 
is used, contributions increase).
 The link between social preferences and punishment is still only partially unders-
tood. The existence of socially oriented subjects (e.g. conditional cooperators) does not 
guarantee that a socially convenient outcome will be obtained. nikiforakis (2008) explo-
res the effect of introducing an additional stage in which subjects may counter punish. 
subjects make a contribution decision and punish; then they are able to send again 
punishment points, to those who punished them, or to any other participant in their group. 
The possibility of being punished back by free riders diminishes the use of punishment 
by cooperators, and its effectiveness. Hermann et al. (2008) document the wide spread 
of antisocial punishment in experiments run in sixteen different laboratories in the world. 
in almost all locations, subjects contributing above the average group contribution are 
punished. in some locations, the proportion of antisocial punishers is so high that the 
positive effect of punishment is fully lost. 
conclusions
Experimental economists, as well as other social scientists, have created an enormous 
amount of evidence documenting various dimensions of sociality in humans. in fact, 
mainstream economists were for a long time very skeptical about results of this type. 
However, the ease of replication of experiments has made it possible to investigate social 
behavior very carefully. Through this process many skeptics have now been convinced. 
it turns out that pure altruism is probably not a central ingredient of humans’ pro-social 
motivations. conditional cooperation and the willingness to incur costs in order to sanc-
tion non-cooperators are the two main pillars of human cooperation.
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